Data security and encryption
1) Why is it critical in iGaming
The iGaming platform works with PII, financial details, game sessions, behavioral traits, anti-fraud signals and ML models. Leakage or substitution of this data leads to fines, market blockages, reputational damage and regression of metrics (GGR, retention).
Data security goals:- Confidentiality (minimal access to PII/finance).
- Integrity (protection against spoofing and dirty data).
- Availability (read/write SLO, DR plans).
- Traceability (who watched/changed what and when).
2) Threat model (shortened)
External: API/integration compromise, MITM, ransomware, suppliers (supply chain).
Internal: redundant rights, "shadow" uploads, toxic logs, configuration errors.
Data and ML: event substitution/feature, model inversion, membership inference.
Jurisdictions: cross-border restrictions, local storage and disposal requirements.
3) Encryption in Transit
TLS 1. 2+/1. 3 only, disable weak cipher suites; preference TLS 1. 3.
mTLS for S2S (yadro↔dataleyk↔katalog↔fichestor↔provaydery).
PFS (ECDHE) - required.
Certificate pinning on mobile/desktop clients and critical integrations.
API signing of requests to providers/PSP (HMAC-SHA-256) and time/repetition control (nonce, idempotency keys).
4) At Rest
Block Tier/Drives:- Encryption of volumes/objects in the/K8s cloud (transparent, but does not protect against "legitimate" reading by a compromised service).
- TDE (Transparent Data Encryption) - base layer.
- FLE/Column-level AEAD for hot fields (email, phone, PAN tokens): AES-256-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305.
- Row-level keys for especially sensitive records (VIP, payments).
- Envelope encryption (KMS-managed DEK, rotation), key access control.
- Manifest signing and integrity control (hash/checksum, Merkle trees for packages).
5) Cryptographic choices (practice)
Symmetric encryption: AES-GCM/ChaCha20-Poly1305 (AEAD) with unique nonce/IV; store 'ciphertext + auth tag'.
Hashing: SHA-256/512 for integrity; for passwords - Argon2id (or bcrypt/scrypt) with parameterization and salt.
Signature: Ed25519/ECDSA P-256 for artifacts/packages; HMAC-SHA-256 for API signature.
Key arrangements: ECDH (P-256/Curve25519).
6) Key management (KMS/HSM)
KMS + HSM for generating/storing master keys; envelope encryption для DEK.
Rotation: regular (calendar) and by event (incident). Dual-read support for the migration period.
Separation of duties (SoD), M-of-N for "break-glass," logging of all operations.
Split-key/Shamir for especially critical secrets (for example, signature of pay-outs).
Geo-scoping keys: different keys for regions/brands.
7) Secret management
Centralized Secrets Manager (not in repository environment variables).
JIT secrets (short-lived), auto-rotation and recall.
Sidecar/CSI for delivering secrets to K8s hearths.
Ban on logs/trails with secrets; leak detectors in the CI.
8) Data integrity and trust
Scheme control (Schema Registry, compatibility), Data Contracts as "trust boundaries."
Signing of events/packages (by the producer) and verification (by the consummer).
Event idempotency and unique keys for anti-replay.
WORM storage for critical journals and reporting.
9) Tokenization, masking and DLP
PII/finance tokenization (vault/FPE/DET) - the use of tokens in logs, storefronts, features.
Masking in UI and uploads; PII edition in ticket/chat texts (NLP sanitation).
DLP policies: prohibited templates (PAN, IBAN, passport), download block, mail inspection/FTP/S3.
10) Access and audit
RBAC/ABAC: role + attributes (country, brand, environment); least rights.
JIT accesses with auto-recall; once every N days - a review of rights.
mTLS + IP allowlist for admin panels and critical end-points.
Audit logs immutable (WORM/append-only), correlation with SIEM.
Break-glass: individual roles/keys, mandatory post-mortem.
11) Backup and DR
3-2-1: 3 copies, 2 different media/CDS, 1 offline/isolated (air-gapped).
Encrypting backups with your own keys (not the provider), scheduled recovery test.
RPO/RTO for domains (payments <X min., game events <Y min.).
Regional replication with key and network crypto isolation.
12) Privacy and compliance
Data classification (Public/Internal/Confidential/Restricted).
Minimization and target linkage (KYC, AML, RG, reporting).
Retention and disposition policies: graphs, Legal Hold, DSAR; crypto-erasure.
Cross-border: geo-zoning and local storage cases.
13) Observability of data safety
Zero-PII in logs (coverage metrics), alerts when DLP is triggered.
Key health: rotations, cipher ops failures, KMS/HSM anomalies.
Integrity SLI - Percentage of packets/events signed and signature-checks verified.
Latency SLO: p95 tokenization/detokenization, encryption/decryption.
Access SLO: the proportion of JIT requests processed at the target time.
14) Tools and process layers (categories)
KMS/HSM: master keys, envelope, signature.
Secrets Manager: JIT secrets, rotation.
TLS termination/mTLS-mesh: ingress/service mesh.
DLP/Masking: inspection, sanitation.
Schema Registry/Contracts: Compatibility, PII prohibitions.
SIEM/SOAR: correlation of audit logs, automatic reactions.
Backup/DR: orchestration of backups, recovery test.
15) Templates (ready to use)
15. 1 Encryption policy (snippet)
Algorithms: AES-256-GCM/ChaCha20-Poly1305; Ed25519 signature; SHA-256 hash.
Keys: generation in HSM; rotation 90 days or on incident; geo-scoped.
Access: only service accounts via mTLS; JIT tokens.
Logs: WORM mode; storage ≥ N months.
Exceptions: by CISO/DPO decision, with justification record.
15. 2 Passport of the protected data set
Domain/table: payments. transactions
Class: Restricted (Finance)
Encryption: FLE (AES-GCM) by fields' card _ token ',' iban ',' payer _ id'
Keys: DEK per-field (envelope KMS)
Tokenization: vault tokens for PAN/phone/email
Access: ABAC (country, role "Payments-Ops"), JIT
Logs: package signature, WORM, retention 2 years
15. 3 Data Release Checklist
- Contract bans PII in gray areas, fields marked 'pii/tokenized'
- TLS 1. 3 and mTLS on S2S enabled
- FLE/TDE configured, keys in KMS/HSM, rotation active
- DLP rules and log masking pass tests
- Backups encrypted, recovery test tested
- SIEM receives audit logs; alerts to attempt detokenization outside the "clean zone"
16) Implementation Roadmap
0-30 days (MVP)
1. Data Classification and Flow Map (PII/Financials/ML).
2. Enable TLS 1. 3/mTLS for S2S; prohibition of weak cipher computers.
3. Pick up KMS/HSM; transfer the keys to the envelope scheme.
4. Enable TDE and FLE for 3 critical domains (Payments/KYC/RG).
5. Log masking and basic DLP rules; Zero-PII qualification.
30-90 days
1. Tokenization of PII/Finance (vault/FPE); JIT accesses and detokenation audits.
2. Event signing and integrity checks in ingestion/ETL.
3. Regular key rotation, split-key for VIP payments.
4. Backups: 3-2-1, offline copy, monthly restore day.
5. Dashboards SLO (Zero-PII, Integrity, Key-Health, Latency).
3-6 months
1. Geo-scoped keys/data by jurisdiction; cross-border policies.
2. WORM storage for audit/reporting; SOAR playbooks.
3. Full coverage with analytics/ML tokens; PII prohibition in display cases.
4. Quarterly exercises: incident simulations (ransomware, key leak, data poisoning).
5. Annual recertification and external audit.
17) RACI (example)
Policies and Controls: CISO/CDO (A), DPO (C), SecOps (R), Domain Owners (C).
Ключи/KMS/HSM: Security/Platform (R), CTO (A), Audit (C).
Tokenization/DLP: Data Platform (R), DPO (A), Domains (C).
Backups/DR: SRE (R), CIO (A).
Monitoring/Incidents: SecOps (R), SOAR (R), Legal/PR (C).
18) Data Security Metrics and SLOs
Zero-PII in logs: ≥ 99. 99% of events.
Integrity-pass: ≥ 99. 9% of signed packages successfully verified.
Key-hygiene: 100% on-time rotations, 0 expired keys.
Detokenization SLO: p95 ≤ X min., only on request with justification.
Backup restore-rate: successful test restores ≥ 99%.
Access review: closed ≥ 95% of excess quarterly audit rights.
Incident MTTR - ≤ the target threshold for P1/P2 types.
19) Anti-patterns
TDE "for show" without FLE and tokenization of sensitive fields.
Storing secrets in environment variables/repositories.
Shared keys/pepper for all domains/regions.
Logs with PII/secrets; without encryption.
No signatures/integrity checks in pipelines.
"Single admin" for all KMS/HSM; no SoD and M-of-N.
20) Playbook Incident (Brief)
1. Detection: SIEM/DLP/audit-log/complaint.
2. Stabilization: segment isolation, key/secret revocation, stopping problem flows.
3. Assessment: what flowed/distorted, scale, jurisdictions, affected.
4. Communications: Legal/PR/regulator (where required), partners/players.
5. Mitigations: rotations, retro tokenization/encryption, backfill/integrity checks.
6. Post-mortem: reasons, lessons, updating policies/thresholds/tests.
21) Related Sections
Data Tokenization, Data Origin and Path, Ethics and Privacy, Confidential ML, Federated Learning, Reducing Bias, DSAR/Legal Hold, Data Observability.
Result
Reliable data protection is a multi-level architecture + process discipline: modern cryptography, strict KMS/HSM, tokenization, signed integrity, clean logs, managed accesses and verifiable backups. In iGaming, platforms win where data is protected by default, and changes are transparent, reproducible, and compliant.