Inheritance of rights and policies

1) Why does the ecosystem need inheritance

• Scaling speed: New nodes/products receive standardized policies out of the box.
• Uniformity and compliance: Top-level guardrails automatically act on child resources.
• Transparency and auditing: predictable order of application, minimizing exceptions.

2) Basic access ontology

2. 1 Hierarchical levels

1. Organization/Ecosystem → Global Security/Data/RG Policies.
2. Tenant/Partner → quotas, jurisdictions, data boundaries, SLO restrictions.
3. Domain (content, payments, KYC, affiliates, analytics, events) → access profile and network perimeters.
4. Service/Application → API/Topicals/Storage.
5. Resource → table/topic/endpoint/secret/stream.

2. 2 Authorization models

RBAC (roles): fast, transparent, well inherited (role → permission set).
ABAC (attributes): flexibility (geo, jurisdiction, risk rate, time).
ReBAC (relationships): access "to resources associated with my entities" (operator ↔ campaign ↔ data).
Practice: RBAC + ABAC hybrid, ReBAC - for ownership/campaign graphs.

3) Policies, scopes and priorities

3. 1 Types of policies

Allow/Deny: Explicit Allow/Deny.
Guardrails: mandatory restrictions (PII out-of-scope, export limits, time-based).
Quotas/Rate: rps/txn/stream/event limits by tenant/channel/region.
Contextual: geo/ASN/device/time/verification/risk scoring conditions.
Delegation: delegation of part of the rights with a constrained scope/TTL.

3. 2 Inheritance and application order

Deny-first: Prohibition is stronger than resolution.
Precedence: `Guardrails (root) > Deny (parent) > Allow (parent) > Deny (child) > Allow (child)`.
Shadowing: Subsidiary Allow does not cancel parent Guardrail/Deny.
Override by Exception: Only written "justified exceptions" with TTL and Autofit.

3. 3 Scopes

Org/Tenant: global rules and quotas.
Environment: prod/stage/sandbox - stiffness increases to prod.
Jurisdiction: data localization, RG constraints.
Data Class: `Public/Internal/Confidential/PII-Sensitive/Financial`.
Operation: read/write/admin/export/impersonate.

4) Policy Trees

4. 1 Structure

/org
/tenants/{tenantId}
/domains/{payments    kyc    content    affiliates    analytics    events}
/services/{api    broker    db    storage    sfu}
/resources/{endpoint    topic    table    bucket    secret}

On each node: list of policies (allow/deny/guardrail/quota/context). Top-down inheritance, local policies add restrictions, but do not remove global prohibitions.

4. 2 Examples

Guardrail org-level: "PII cannot be taken to webhooks outside the whitelist of countries."

Tenant-level: "KYC operators from countries X are prohibited; Export reports only aggregates.

Domain payments: "Write only through a service account with mTLS and a ≤ key of 24h."

Service api: "POST/deposits only with'Idempotency-Key '."

Resource topic: "Read'kyc _ status' only to services with the'KYC role. moderation` и ABAC `verified=true`».

5) Delegation and temporary rights

Just-in-Time (JIT) Access TTL (single-use).
Break-Glass: emergency access with immediate audit and subsequent parsing.
Scoped Tokens: minimum set of'scopes' (read: topic/kyc; write:api/deposit) + audience/issuer.
Chain-of-Trust: cross-service tokens bound to a device/ASN/subnet.
Impersonation: only through a proxy service with a log and limits.

6) Inheritance in domains

6. 1 Payments (PSP/APM)

Parent guardrail: "all calls - via mTLS + JWS, timeout ≤ N, retras with jitter; chargeback hook mandatory."

The child service can add quotas/caps to the AWP/region. Deny to direct calls bypassing the orchestrator.

6. 2 KYC/AML

Parent Deny: "a raw document cannot be written to analytics."

Subsidiary Allow: "transfer only hash/verdict/risk categories."

6. 3 Content/Streaming

Org guardrail: "minimum bitrate and latency-SLO."

Tenant-override: "reduced quality in roaming, but not lower than SLO."

Resource: access to a specific live table - only segments with RG-OK.

6. 4 Events/EDA

Root: schemes/versions in-registry, exactly-once in business sense.
Domain: party keys, dedup politics.
Service: who can write/read the topic; quotas/lag-budget.

7) Privacy and Zero Trust

PII minimization and tokenization by default, the policy "cannot be de-tokenized outside safe zones."

Network segmentation: vendor-VPC, egress-allow-list, inter-zone mesh policies.
mTLS/JWS/HMAC for S2S and webhooks, short-lived keys (JWKS/rotation).
SoD (Segregation of Duties): read roles ≠ administration roles ≠ key release roles.
Jurisdictions: inherited rules of localization, prohibition of cross-border export of personal data without DPA/DPIA.

8) Observability and audit of inheritance

Policy Evaluation Trace: magazine "what policy where worked" with 'traceId'.
Diff log: who/when changed the policy tree; WORM storage.
Conformance tests: regular runs of access scenarios (allow/deny; export; impersonation).
Alerts: deny/guardrail triggers, quota overruns, bypass attempts.

9) Conflicts and their resolution

Define class: Allow/Deny collision, guardrail violation, ABAC intersection.
Apply precedence order (see § 3. 2).
Classify the exception: temporary (TTL), permanent (rule), erroneous (rollback).
Add artifacts: RFC/CR request, link to risk assessment, auto checks in CI.

10) Anti-patterns

Manual issued rights without TTL ("forever").
Allow-by-default and silent exceptions.
Inheritance without visible guardrails - child branches overlap secure rules.
Role blending (admin = analyst = operator) - no SoD.
Export of raw personal data to third-party services, "temporary" webhooks without a signature.
Disabled audit with break-glass.
Floating versions of schemes: analytics/EDA travels, deny does not work on new fields.

11) Policy Tree Design Checklist

1. Classify the data (Public/Internal/Confidential/PII/Financial).
2. Define hierarchy levels and node owners (RACI).
3. Set guardrails at the root (Zero Trust, PII, RG, jurisdictions).
4. Form RBAC roles and ABAC attributes; enable SoD.
5. Describe the scopes (org/tenant/env/jurisdiction/data class/operation).
6. Enable delegation/TTL and break-glass with audit loop.
7. Write down the precedence and conflict (deny-first, override process).
8. Set up observability: evaluation-trace, diff-log, alerts.
9. Run conformance dialing and regular exception reviews.
10. Document: policy portal, examples, sandboxes, simulators.

12) Maturity metrics

Coverage: share of resources covered by legacy policies and conformance tests.
Drift: number of local exceptions/100 resources; average TTL exception.
SoD Score: Share of users sharing responsibilities.
PII Exposure: number of exports outside safe zones (target = 0).
Auditability:% of requests with evaluation-trace; MTTR by access contention.
Change Velocity: CR time by policy with inheritance in mind.

13) Sample patterns (schematic)

• Deny: `export:PII` if `destination. country ∉ whitelist`
• Require: `mTLS && JWS` for `webhook:`
• Quota: `read:event: ≤ X rps per tenant`

• Allow: `write:api/deposit` if `verified && risk_score < T && geo ∈ allowed`
• Deny: `direct:psp/`

• Allow: `read` for role `KYC. moderation` where `jurisdiction == resource. jurisdiction`
• Deny: `write` except service `kyc-orchestrator`

14) Evolution Roadmap

v1 (Foundation): policy tree, guardrails at root, RBAC, deny-first, audit changes.
v2 (Integration): ABAC, delegation/TTL, conformance-set, evaluation-trace.
v3 (Automation): auto-scoping by jurisdiction/data, policy-as-code, auto-checks in CI/CD, auto-quarantine violations.
v4 (Networked Governance): inter-partner federation of policies, cross-tenant delegation with crypto signature, predictive prompts (risk rate) for granting rights.

Brief Summary

Inheritance of rights and policies is the framework of a safe and fast ecosystem. Build a policy-tree with guardrails on the root, use deny-first and precedence, combine RBAC + ABAC + ReBAC, use delegation with TTL and strict auditing. Automate checks and exception management - and you have a scalable, compliant, and predictable access model for your entire network of participants.